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Abstract
Part I of this Article takes a brief tour through military history on the consistent use of merce-
naries through the ages, which Peter Singer illuminates masterfully in Corporate Warriors. Next, a
brief overview on the binding nature (or not) of international custom and treaty is explored in Part
II and then the codifications of international law are taken up in Part III, beginning with the Hague
and Geneva Conventions. Several United Nations (“U.N.”) instruments are analyzed for their ef-
ficacy in changing the long-standing customary international law on the use of mercenaries and
whether or not each is applicable to PMF contractors. Part IV closes out the Article by discussing
alternative bodies of domestic law that provide criminal accountability, including the recent case
of Alaa Mohammad Ali, a civilian contractor working in Iraq who was convicted on June 23, 2008
by court martial under the recent changes to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”).
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INTRODUCTION
On September 16, 2007 a car bomb exploded 200 yards
from a meeting in Baghdad that included Kerry Pelzman, a spe-
cialist with the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment.1 Her Blackwater security detail rushed her to a waiting
convoy and radioed to the Green Zone for backup, fearing the
explosion might be the prelude to an abduction attempt.2
The arriving support convoy's route around the Nusoor
Square traffic circle was blocked by a construction barrier pro-
tecting a maintenance crew.' Nearby cars were repeatedly
* Assistant Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law, and Law and Public Policy
Instructor, California University of Pennsylvania. LL.M, 2004, University of Notre
Dame School of Law; LL.M., 1995, The Judge Advocate General's School, U.S. Army;
J.D., 1987, Marquette University Law School; B.A., 1984, Marquette University. Special
thanks to my family and to my colleagues at Ave Maria School of Law and California
University of Pennsylvania for their immeasurable support and encouragement, and
kudos to my learned and patient co-author and colleague.
** General Attorney, Office of Associate Chief Counsel, Miami, Florida, United
States ("U.S.") Customs and Border Protection ("CBP"), Department of Homeland Se-
curity. J.D., 2008, Ave Maria School of Law; B.A., 1998, Texas A&M University. In grati-
tude to my wife, Jennifer, for her immeasurable patience and special thanks to James
Olson, Senior Lecturer and Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") Officer-in-Residence
at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University
for his encouragement. This Article is the result of independent research by the au-
thors and was written prior to Mr. Bales' employment with CBP. It does not represent
the views of CBP, the Department of Homeland Security, or the United States; all opin-
ions, errors and omissions are solely the responsibility of the authors.
1. Iraqi Report: Witnesses Recount Terror in Blackwater Shooting, CNN, Oct. 8, 2007,
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/10/08/blackwater.thatday.ap/index.
html (last visited Nov. 3, 2008) [hereinafter CNN Report].
2. Id.
3. Iraq Demands $136M Blackwater Payout, CBSNEws.coM, Oct 8, 2007, http://
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/08/iraq/printable3343975.shtml (last visited Dec.
17, 1008).
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warned to stop but one driven by a twenty year-old, third-year
medical student, continued to approach despite the warnings-
he was fired upon and killed instantly.4 The backup convoy
pushed the barriers aside, firing on other cars and a city bus that
continued to advance. Finally clear of the impediment, the
backup team moved through the traffic circle against the flow of
traffic toward Pelzman's convoy as it rushed back to the Green
Zone.5 Witnesses swear that Blackwater was not under attack at
the time of the shootings.6 The Blackwater operators say other-
wise.7
The incident at Nusoor Square focused the public's atten-
tion on the use of private security contractors in Iraq, if the hor-
rific image of the burnt corpses of Blackwater operators hanging
from a Fallujah bridge had not already.' Who are these opera-
tors and what role do they serve? Are they mercenaries? What is
their status under international law? What restraint or accounta-
bility exists? These questions form the basis of this Article.
Private Military Firms ("PMFs") 9 like Blackwater are corpo-
rate bodies that specialize in the provision of military skills, in-
cluding combat operations. 1° PMFs operate globally, often with
strategic impact on both the process and outcome of conflicts."
They have become integral to the peacetime security systems of
rich and poor states alike.12 According to Senator Lindsey Gra-
ham of South Carolina, the use of private contractors "is the way
we are going to war in the future."'"
Numerous legal commentators suggest, and news reporters
4. See CNN Report, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Bushra Juhi, Survivor Recalls Blackwater Shooting, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 21,
2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/20/AR2007
092001404.html.
7. See generally CNN Report, supra note 1.
8. See, e.g., The High-Risk Contracting Business, FRONTLINE, June 21, 2005, http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/contractors/highrisk.html.
9. Like Richard Morgan, we make narrow use of Peter Singer's term Private Mili-
tary Firm ("PMF") to include only security contractors. See Richard Morgan, Professional
Military Firms Under International Law, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 213, 216 (2008).
10. See P. W. SINGER, CORPORATE IARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY
INDUSTRY 8 (2003).
11. Id. at 9.
12. Id.
13. Lydia Gensheimer, War Zone Crimes: Accountability MIA, CQ WKLY., May 11,
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 9399034.
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often parrot, two erroneous blanket assertions: that PMF con-
tractors are mercenaries" and only standing national armies can
legitimately engage in warfare. 15 PMF contractors are not, in
fact, mercenaries. 6 Frankly, it is unlikely that anyone could ever
be shown to be a mercenary under current international law. 7
International instruments on point enjoy little support, and con-
trary practice by the international community casts a dubious
shadow over whether those instruments are true codifications of
customary international law.'" As to national armies as the only
legitimate combatants, their existence is a recent innovation.
Mercenaries, however, have existed as long as recorded history.
These dynamics present the fascinating but difficult issue of
where PMF contractors fit into the legal order in an armed con-
flict. Part I of this Article takes a brief tour through military his-
tory on the consistent use of mercenaries through the ages,
which Peter Singer illuminates masterfully in Corporate Warriors. 9
14. See United Nations (U.N.) Hum. Rts. Council, Working Group on the Use of
Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the
Right of People to Self-Determination, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil,
Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, 56, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/7/7 (Jan. 9, 2008) (prepared byJose Luis Gomez del Prado), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/mercenaries/docs/A.HRC.7.7.pdf ("[The
Working Group] is of the opinion that many such manifestations are new modalities of
mercenary-related activities."); Alexander Higgins, US Rejects UN Mercenary Report, USA
TODAY, Oct. 17, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-10-17-3392316246_
x.htm ("[The] U.N. report... said the use of private security guards like those involved
in the [Nusoor Square] shooting. .. amounted to a new form of mercenary activity.").
15. See Zoe Salzman, Private Military Contractors and the Taint of a Mercenary Reputa-
tion, 40 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 853, 878 (2008).
16. See Antenor Hallo de Wolf, Modern Condottieri in Iraq: Privatizing War from the
Perspective of International and Human Rights Law, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 315, 324
(2006) ("[O]ne of the most fervent and skeptical critics of [PMFs], the former U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries, Enrique Ballesteros, has implicitly acknowledged
that it is necessary to distinguish [PMFs] and their personnel from actual merce-
naries.").
17. Professor Geoffrey Best argues that any individual who could not exclude him-
self from the poorly drafted definition(s) of mercenary "deserves to be shot-and his
attorney with him!" GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE: THE MODERN HISTORY OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF ARIMED CONFLICT 375 n.83 (1980).
18. Salzman, supra note 15, at 878 (though highly critical of PMFs and advocating
application of the international conventions against mercenarism against PMFs, Salz-
man buries an admission in the closing paragraphs of Part IV of her article that the
conventions are without real effect because of low ratification and widespread contrary
state practice).
19. See generally SINGER, supra note 10. Peter Singer is a National Security Fellow
at the Brookings Institute and is widely published in his critiques against the privatiza-
tion of warfare.
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Next, a brief overview on the binding nature (or not) of interna-
tional custom and treaty is explored in Part II and then the
codifications of international law are taken up in Part III, begin-
ning with the Hague and Geneva Conventions. Several United
Nations ("U.N.") instruments are analyzed for their efficacy in
changing the long-standing customary international law on the
use of mercenaries and whether or not each is applicable to PMF
contractors. 20 Part IV closes out the Article by discussing alterna-
tive bodies of domestic law that provide criminal accountability,
including the recent case of Alaa Mohammad Ai, a civilian con-
tractor working in Iraq who was convicted on June 23, 2008 by
court martial under the recent changes to the Uniform Code of
Military Justice ("UCMJ").
I. HISTORY OF MERCENARIES
Peter W. Singer, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute
and ardent critic of PMFs, readily admits the hiring of private
individuals to fight battles "is as old as war itself."' 2' The contem-
porary notion that war was fought exclusively by standing armies
of sovereign nation-states is erroneous.2 2 The "monopoly of the
state over violence is the exception in world history, rather than
the rule. '23 The sovereign nation-state is a "new" model that
throughout its 400-year existence has availed itself of private war-
riors to build and maintain public power.2 4
A. Mercenarism in Ancient History
The earliest recorded use of mercenaries rests with King
Shulgi of Ur (2094-2047 B.C.). 25 King Ramses II is chronicled
20. Todd Milliard's exhaustive research on the experiences of post-colonial Africa
in shaping international law on mercenarism provides an oft-cited template that greatly
informs the analysis in Part II. Milliard focuses on the post-colonial African context
and recommends a new regulatory scheme for PMFs. See generally Todd S. Milliard, Over-
coming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate Private Military Companies,
176 MIL. L. Rv. 1 (2003). This Article departs from this emphasis and instead surveys
the international law on point and its deficiencies before moving on to existing domes-
tic U.S. law that may provide some degree of accountability.
21. SINGER, supra note 10, at 19.
22. See id.
23. JANICE THOMSON, MERCENARIES, PIRATES AND SOVEREIGNS: STATE BUILDING AND
EXTRATERRITORIAL VIOLENCE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 15 (1996).
24. SINGER, supra note 10, at 20.
25. Id.
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as leading an army whose ranks swelled with Numidian merce-
naries in the Battle for Kadesh in 1294 B.C.26 King David used
mercenaries to drive out the Philistines in 1000 B.C.2 7 Most an-
cient Greek city-states relied on mercenaries as force multipli-
ers-save Sparta and a few others. 28 Alexander the Great in-
vaded Persia with one-third of his army constituting merce-
naries. 29 By the end of his conquest of Persia, almost the entire
army was comprised of mercenaries.30 The vast majority of Cae-
sar's cavalry were mercenaries,31 as were the feoderati of Justin-
ian's East Roman Army.3 2 Even at its height, the Roman Empire
continued to use hired foreign troops, eventually resulting in its
legions being more Germanic than Roman. 3 Mercenaries were
also heavily relied upon during the Norman Conquest,34 by Ital-
ian city-states during the Renaissance,3" and by Britain in her at-
tempt to put down the rebellion that became the American Rev-
olutionary War.36
B. Europe and the Free Companies
The PMF model is not a new concept. Their corporate
form can be traced back as early as the Byzantine Empire, which
made use of Norse mercenaries that later formed the Varangian
Guard. 7 The Byzantine Empire also employed the services of
the Grand Catalan Company, the longest-lasting "free com-
pany."3 Free companies flourished in Europe for over 150 years
until their wealth and power was too much for European nobil-
ity.
The first blow leading to the demise of the free companies
26. See R. ERNEST Dupuv & TREVOR N. Dupuy, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY HIS-
TORY FROM 3500 B.C. TO THE PRESENT 6 (2d ed. 1986).
27. Milliard, supra note 20, at 2.
28. G.T. GRIFFITH, THE MERCENARIES OF THE HELLENISTIC WORLD 4 (1935).
29. Id. at 12-13.
30. SINGER, supra note 10, at 21.
31. DuPuy, supra note 26, at 98.
32. Milliard, supra note 20, at 2.
33. SINGER, supra note 10, at 21.
34. Milliard, supra note 20, at 2.
35. Id. at 2.
36. See ANTHONY MOCKLER, THE NEW MERCENARIES 6 (1985); cf ROBERT YOUNG
PELTON, LICENSED TO KILL: HIRED GUNS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 3 (2006) (Colonial
American forces also resorted to mercenaries).
37. DuPuY, supra note 26, at 303-06, 382.
38. Id. at 387-88; see also MOCKLER, supra note 36, at 9-10.
20081
60 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
came in the fifteenth century at the hands of King Charles VII of
France.39 The French solution was to establish a standing army
that absorbed many of the free companies and vanquished the
others.4 ° This provoked the neighboring Duke of Burgundy to
follow suit, and so began a trend across Europe.4 Those merce-
naries surviving the turn-out in France moved into Italy and its
42
condottiere companies.
The Italian city-states continued the use of mercenaries be-
cause their use was a more efficient and expedient manner of
warfare. This enabled the nobles to avoid the disruption of mo-
bilizing the entire population of a city-state militia and allowed
the productivity of its merchant class to continue relatively un-
abated.43 The Italian city-states mitigated free-company power
through craftily dividing contracts among "mutually jealous"
captains and by bestowing honors on the loyal and successful
ones, integrating them into Italian society and minimizing the
risk of coups.44 After a time, however, entrepreneurs within in-
dividual city-states replicated the free company model and obvi-
ated the need for foreign mercenaries.45 Consequently, some
"local companies" became so powerful they seized control of
their employing city-states.46
As standing armies became the norm in Europe, mercenary
use declined but did not altogether disappear.47 The Swiss, for
example, specializing in fielding entire units rather than individ-
ual warriors, supplied sovereigns throughout Western Europe
with experienced pike men and other unique units.4" The Swiss
were so renowned for their skill in battle that Pope Julius II
formed the Papal Guard from available Swiss units in the six-
teenth century.49
39. SINGER, supra note 10, at 26.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Dupu_', supra note 26, at 409.
43. SINGER, supra note 10, at 22.
44. Id. at 23.
45. See id. at 26.
46. See SINGER, supra note 10, at 26.
47. SeeJonathan D. Heskett, The Potential Scope for Use of Private Military Com-
panies in Military Operations: An Historical and Economic Analysis (Dec. 2005) (un-
published Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/
ADA443220.
48. MOCKLER, supra note 36, at 8-9.
49. Milliard, supra note 20, at 10.
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By the 1600s war had become Europe's largest industry. 51
As a result a new generation of entrepreneurs sprang up to re-
cruit, equip, train, and lease entire units of mercenaries to the
highest bidder.51 Among the most successful were Louis de
Greer (providing Sweden with an entire navy, including its
sailors), Count Ernst von Mansfeld (raising an entire army for
Frederick V, Elector Palatine) and Bernard von Weimar (field-
ing armies for Sweden and France).52 Count Wilhelm von
Schaumburg even established an international military academy
for officers of all nations in order to train and pass on the laws of
war.
53
The use of mercenary forces continued through the Thirty
Years' War (1618-48), 54 but it became painfully clear to the em-
ploying sovereigns that mercenary units devastated the country-
side by living off the land at the expense of the populace, mak-
ing fiscal cost-benefit not worth the high social costs. 55 In the
end, the Peace of Westphalia brought the greatest suppressing
blow to the free companies by formally ushering in the era of
sovereign states and heralding the preference of standing na-
tional armies.56
C. The Joint-Stock Companies
The practice of mercenarism continued after Westphalia,
perhaps most notably by the Trade Companies of the eighteenth
century.57 Interestingly, the corporate warriors in their employ
did not serve the interests of the state but instead those of the
shareholders. Joint-stock companies like the Dutch East India
Company were given exclusive trade rights within geographic re-
gions and invested with a kind of sovereignty and dominion that
gave them absolute power to "make [ ] peace and war at plea-
sure, and by [their] own authority; administer[ ] justice to all;
... settle colonies, build[ ] fortifications, lev[y] troops, main-
tain[ ] numerous armies and garrisons, fit[] out fleets, and
50. SINGER, supra note 10, at 28.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 33.
54. Id. at 28.
55. Id. at 29.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 34.
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coin[ ] money."58 In this vein, the British East India Company
fielded an army of 100,000 foreign troops that surpassed King
George II's standing army.5 9
Frequently, the Trade Companies disregarded instructions
from their sovereigns and waged politically expensive, but eco-
nomically profitable, wars upon other Trade Companies.6 °
Eventually, however, the Trading Companies became victims of
their own success, suffocating beneath the financial weight of an
enormous military apparatus that had become largely unneces-
sary with the elimination of competitors and local dissent. 6' The
English Crown only continued to subsidize the British East India
Company because it was uncertain how else to maintain effective
rule in India.62 The Supoy Mutiny in 1857, which cost 11,000
European lives and required regular British troops to suppress it,
brought the dissolution of the British East India Company a year
later.6' The last two private companies governing colonial terri-
tories (Rhodesia and Mozambique) did not come to an end until
the early twentieth century.
6 4
D. Mercenarism in Decolonized Africa
The end of the Cold War was the catalyst for the growth of
modern mercenarism.65 As the United States and the Soviet
Union began downsizing, the "market" was flooded with soldiers
highly skilled in combat arms.66 With the thaw in relations with
the Soviet Union, the superpowers were less concerned about
maintaining dominating influence around the globe. The com-
bination of shrinking militaries and their diminishing commit-
ment to regional security sustained the mercenary trade by leav-
ing unfilled security needs, particularly in Africa.6 7
Colonial powers looking to maintain their influence during
58. Id.
59. Id. at 35.
60. Id. at 35-36.
61. See id. at 36.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 37.
65. See Ryan Scoville, Toward an Accountability-Based Definition of "Mercenary," 37
GEO. J. INT'L L. 541, 542 (2006).
66. Id.
67. See Donald G. McNeil Jr., Pocketing the Wages of War, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1997,
§ 4, at 45.
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the decolonization of the 1950s and 1960s were the backers of
mercenaries operating in Africa.6' The most damning link for
mercenarism was the link with Apartheid. From this and similar
uses, mercenaries became synonymous with the suppression of
self-determination movements and international opinion quickly
turned against what had been the long-accepted practice of pri-
vate actors in warfare. 69
This is not to say mercenaries were without their meritori-
ous service in Africa. In 1994, Executive Outcomes was hired by
the Angolan government to prevent its overthrow by the rebel
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
("UNITA").W7 Executive Outcomes decimated UNITA, allowing
Angola's government to remain in control and consolidate its
power. In 1995, Executive Outcomes did much the same for Si-
erra Leone when it dislodged the Revolutionary United Front
from the diamond fields and forced them to negotiate a peace
settlement with the government. 71 Nevertheless, due in large
part to the cruel behavior of mercenaries in the decolonization
conflicts, many countries moved to restrict and/or prohibit
mercenarism.72 Chief among these efforts are the Protocol Ad-
ditional to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts ("Protocol I") and the
International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financ-
ing and Training of Mercenaries ("Convention Against Merce-
naries").7 Each of these is discussed in Part III of this Article.
68. See SINGER, supra note 10, at 37.
69. See, e.g., The Secretary General, Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries as a
Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of People to Self-Deter-
mination, delivered to the Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/49/362 (Sept. 6, 1994).
70. See Thomas K Adams, The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict, 24
PARAMETERS 109 (1999).
71. See id.
72. See William C. Peters, On Law, Wars and Mercenaries: The Case for Courts-Martial
Jurisdiction over Civilian Contractor Misconduct in Iraq, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REv. 367, 412-13
(2006).
73. See, e.g., The District General, United Nations International Convention Against the
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/34 (Dec. 4,
1989) [hereinafter Convention Against Mercenaries]; Protocol Additional to the Ge-
neva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Inter-
national Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. [hereinafter Protocol I].
2008]
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E. Rise of Contemporary Mercenaries and Private Military Firms
By the nineteenth century, strong national armies had di-
minished the need and the opportunity for mercenaries,7 4 but
the diminishing interest of the superpowers in the security of
weaker states created an opportunity for unemployed soldiers to
once again band together and fill the unmet need of countries
unable to provide effectively for their own security. 75 It was not
until the events of September 11, 2001, however, that mercenar-
ism experienced its Renaissance. Shortly after September 11,
President George W. Bush signed a presidential finding that au-
thorized the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") to kill Osama
bin Laden and his cohorts.7 7
Finding itself short on paramilitary operators, the CIA hired
private contractors for initial combat operations in Afghani-
stan.78 During the initial stages of the campaign, over half of the
100 CIA paramilitary operators in Afghanistan were contrac-
tors.79 The CIA also contracted security services from PMFs like
Blackwater.8 ° The majority of Blackwater's security operations
occurred at the Kabul Airport and the Ariana Hotel, but a small
detachment was stationed at "Fort Apache," the firebase from
which "Task Force 11" operated.81
The renaissance of "mercenarism" has come largely in the
form of PMFs conducting stationary and convoy security in active
combat zones rather than outright combat operations. PMFs
have or are currently operating in: Africa (Angola, Congo, Ethi-
opia, Sudan, Algeria, Kenya and Uganda); Europe (Croatia, Bos-
nia, Kosovo); the former Soviet Union (Chechnya, Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Kazakhstan); the Middle East (Afghanistan, Saudi Ara-
bia, Kuwait); Asia (Papua New Guinea, Taiwan, Cambodia,
74. Milliard, supra note 20, at 10.
75. See Tina Garmon, Domesticating International Corporate Responsibility: Holding Pri-
vate Military Firms Accountable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 11 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
325, 326-27 (2003).
76. See Eugene B. Smith, The New Condottieri and U.S. Policy: The Privatization of Con-
flict and Its Implications, 32 PARAMETERS 104, 107-08 (2002).
77. PELTON, supra note 36, at 30.
78. Id. at 30-31.
79. Id. at 32 (the other half were CIA employees or Special Forces operators on
loan to the CIA).
80. Id. at 31, 37.
81. Id. at 38-39 ("Task Force 11" is the special forces unit tasked to operate in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border region and neutralize Osama bin Laden).
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Burma, Philippines, Indonesia); and, the Americas (Columbia,
Haiti, Mexico, United States).2 In Iraq there are over 155,000
civilian contractors; 3 up to 30,000 of them provide protective
security functions, 4 making private contractors collectively the
second-largest armed component in Iraq.s5 The most recent ac-
counts suggest that the number of civilian contractors in Iraq
actually outnumbers the U.S. troop presence.86
Absorbing the surplus of highly trained, professional
soldiers, PMFs are largely staffed by veterans of First World ar-
mies. v Collectively, the PMFs offer a full range of military ser-
vices.8" In fact, Blackwater has the capability of fielding a 1700-
man brigade of private soldiers with its own cadre of helicopters
and cargo planes.89 Clients can also hire private gunships, intel-
ligence gathering, aerial surveillance, armored cars, remote-con-
trolled blimps and fast-attack aircraft.9"
That said, the United Kingdom's Foreign and Common-
wealth Office reported in Private Militay Companies: Options for
Regulation that few PMFs are actually capable or willing to pro-
vide private military forces for actual combat operations.91 Still,
many legal commentators insist on branding PMF contractors as
mercenaries.92 As we will see, "mercenary" is a term of art that
can seldom be applied to most actual mercenaries and even
fewer PMF contractors.
82. SINGER, supra note 10, at 8-17; see also Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability:
The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L.Q.
1001, 1024-37 (2004).
83. David Ivanovich, Contractor Deaths Up 17 Percent Across Iraq in 2007, Hous.
CHRON., Feb. 10, 2008, at Al.
84. Matthew Quirk, Private Military Contractors, ATL. MONTHLY, Sep. 2004, at 39,
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200409/quirk.
85. J.T. Mlinarcik, Private Military Contractors &Justice: A Look at the Industry, Black-
water & the Fallujah Incident, 4 REGENT J. IINT'L L. 129, 133 (2006).
86. See generally Gensheimer, supra note 13.
87. See UNITED KINGDOM FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, PRIATE MILITARY
COMPANIES: OPTIONS FOR REGULATION, 2001-2002, H.C. 577, at 1 25, available at http://
www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/consultations-mercenaries [hereinafter U.K. GREEN
PAPER].
88. Milliard, supra note 20, at 11.
89. PELTON, supra note 36, at 4.
90. Id.
91. U.K. GREEN PAPER, supra note 87, 1 24.
92. Salzman, supra note 15, at 876-79.
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II. INTERNATIONAL LAW: BINDING OR NOT?
THAT IS THE QUESTIONt
The negative historical connotations of mercenary use in
post-colonial Africa resulted in a push for criminalizing
mercenarism. Resulting international provisions, however, fail
to adequately define mercenaries and remain ineffective in es-
tablishing a regulatory scheme that could be applied plausibly to
mercenaries, let alone modern PMFs.94 Before we can reach
that discussion, however, it behooves us to briefly explore how
and whether international law becomes binding. The sources of
international law are: (1) treaties, (2) customary international
law, (3) jus cogens principles ("peremptory norms") recognized
by civilized nations, and (4) judicial decisions of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.9 5 For purposes of this Article, only trea-
ties and customary international law are discussed in detail.
A. Treaties
Treaties are definitive sources of international law.9 6 Bind-
ing treaties are those between states that are memorialized in
writing, intend to convey legal obligations or create reliance, and
are subject to governance under international law.97 There is no
legal distinction between the various written instruments-trea-
ties, conventions, and protocols all carry the same weight.9"
While treaties are generally regarded as binding upon only those
states party to them, a treaty can nevertheless bind non-party
states insofar as it is declaratory of customary international law.99
Some commentators differentiate treaties codifying custom-
ary international law from those promulgating innovations.'
There is an attempt to explain whether new treaties are likely to
93. See E.L. Gaston, Mercenarism 2.0? The Rise of the Modern Private Security Industry
and Its Implications for International Humanitarian Law Enforcement, 49 HARV. INT'L. L.J.
221, 230-31 (2008).
94. Dupuy, supra note 26, at 335.
95. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, ch. 2, June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
96. DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 26 (2d ed. 2006).
97. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
98. See BEDERMAN, supra note 96, at 26.
99. See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, THE SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 42-45 (2002).
100. BEDERMAN, supra note 96, at 27.
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garner sufficient international support.' ° ' Near unanimity can
be indicative of customary international law, a high number of
accessions alone is not dispositive when state practice is contrary
to a treaty.' 0 2 Even treaties with few accessions and non-binding
resolutions serve more than a rhetorical purpose-they often
signal the opening stages of a drive toward creating customary
international law. 10 3
B. Customary International Law
Custom is evidence of a general practice among states that
is accepted as law. The formation of customary international law
rests on two key elements: states following the norm in general
practice (usus) and doing so under a sense of obligation of law
(opiniojuris sive necessitatis).'°4 General practice is considered to
be a "source of signal strength" for custom.10'5
The "general practice" element involves an objective in-
quiry: do international actors follow the rule consistently?' 06 In
showing general practice, what states do is far more important
than what states say. Still, practitioners rely on correspondence,
publications and media accounts to demonstrate past prac-
tice.' ° 7 The "sense of obligation" element is a subjective inquiry
of whether past observation comes from a sense of legal duty or
merely because they were politically expedient.'0 8 Those actions
undertaken for expedience are not considered performed under
a sense of obligation.
There is no temporal requirement for lengthy observation
before a rule can become binding custom.109 Popular practices
can enjoy immediate recognition. 110 It is the consistent and uni-
101. Id.
102. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law,
857 INT'L REV. RED CRoss 175, 183 (2005).
103. BEDERMAN, supra note 96, at 28; see also Beatrice Jarka, 30 Years from the
Adoption of Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Convention, at 1-2, 4-5 (un-
published dissertation, Universitatea Nicolae Titulescu), http://lexetsciena.univnt.
ro/ufiles/3.%2ORomania.pdf (admitting that Protocol I inserted innovations in an at-
tempt to change then-existing laws of war on mercenarism).
104. BEDERMAN, supra note 96, at 16; Henckaerts, supra, note 102 at 178.
105. BEDERMAN, supra note 96, at 16.
106. Id. at 16-17.
107. Id. at 17.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 19.
110. Id.
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form observance by most (if not all) of the international commu-
nity that confirms a rule as a "general practice.""' An important
note is the presumption in customary international law that si-
lence equates to acceptance.' 12 If a state truly disagrees with a
practice, it is incumbent upon it to protest loudly and often." 3
Otherwise, new practices become the rule, rather than the excep-
tion.
III. EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL LAW ON MERCENARIES
In addition to discussing the two most popularly cited in-
struments-Protocol I and the Convention Against Merce-
naries-this Part begins with a discussion of the Hague Conven-
tions and the Geneva Conventions, then moves through numer-
ous U.N. Resolutions.' 14
A. The Hague Conventions
The Hague Conventions represent the first attempt to cod-
ify customary international law on the use of mercenaries.11
The Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land ("Hague V") sought
to clarify the rights and duties of neutral states toward belliger-
ent states during war by regulating mercenary recruitment.' 16 Its
drafters distinguished between active recruitment of merce-
naries by a state within its own territory and "the acts of individual
citizens leaving to join a [mercenary] force of their own ac-
cord.""' 7 Specifically, Article 4 precludes a neutral state from
opening recruitment centers within its borders and raising ar-
mies for the benefit of a party to an armed conflict.' On the
other hand, Article 6 expressly communicates that a state is not
required to prevent its citizens nor foreign nationals from cross-
111. Id.
112. Id. at 22.
113. See id. at 23-24.
114. See generally Protocol I, supra note 73; Convention Against Mercenaries, supra
note 73.
115. See H.C. Burmester, The Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries in Armed Conflicts, 72
AM.J. INT'L L. 37, 42 (1978).
116. See id.; see also Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Pow-
ers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 540
[hereinafter Hague V].
117. Burmester, supra note 115, at 41.
118. See Hague V, supra note 116, art. 4.
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ing its frontier to join the ranks of a belligerent's army." 9
While a neutral state is required to refrain from domestic
recruitment or staging of mercenaries, Hague V does not outlaw
mercenarism. 120 Thus, a nation's own citizens can freely choose
to become mercenaries. Furthermore, foreign nationals are free
to transit through a neutral country en route to serve as a merce-
nary for a belligerent.
The Hague Convention does not apply to PMFs because
they are private corporations, not the state actors at whom
Hague V is aimed.12 1 If one were to postulate that PMF contrac-
tors are the functional equivalent of mercenaries, the Hague
Convention places no burden on the individual and, frankly, no
burden on neutral states to prevent their citizens or those of for-
eign countries from entering the fray. The only thing Hague V
would preclude is the establishment of a wholly-owned PMF cor-
poration by a nation's government.
B. The Geneva Conventions
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Pris-
oners of War ("Geneva III") is applicable whenever parties con-
duct themselves as belligerents-a declaration of war is not nec-
essary. 122 Geneva III establishes, inter alia, the protections due to
prisoners of war ("POWs"), setting out six qualifying classes in
Article 4A: (1) members of an armed force; (2) members of a
militia or similar volunteers, provided they operate under a des-
ignated leader, wear a fixed, distinct emblem recognizable from
a distance, openly carry arms and conduct military operations
within the laws of war; (3) members of an armed force of a gov-
ernment not recognized by one of the parties; (4) civilian staff
providing logistical support to an armed force; (5) civil air crews
of a state who is party to the conflict; and (6) civilians who par-
take in a spontaneous uprising to repel an invading force.
123
119. See id. art. 6.
120. Jackson Maogoto and Benedict Sheehy, Contemporary Private Military Firms
Under International Law: An Unregulated 'Gold Rush', 26 ADEL. L. REv. 245, 263-64
(2005).
121. See id. at 254; see also P.W. Singer, War Profits and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized
Military Firms and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521, 531 (2004).
122. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 2,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III].
123. Id. art. 4A.
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Combatant immunity from reprisal 24 and prosecution for acts
not violative of international law (read: engaging in hostili-
ties) 125 hinge upon membership in one of these classes. A full
survey of specific POW protections is beyond the scope of this
Article, but they can be found in Articles 12 to 121 of Geneva III.
1. Acknowledging the Link Between Geneva III and Protocol I
Informed readers know that Protocol I (1977) compliments
Geneva III (1949) and that the Convention cannot be read with-
out the Protocol.1 26 Though the United States has never be-
come a participating state in Protocol I, it bears significantly on
international law and a substantive discussion of international
law on mercenarism would be incomplete without its inclusion.
The approach of this article is to move through the numerous
international instruments in chronological order, which necessa-
rily postpones a substantive discussion of Protocol I.
2. Application of Geneva III
Nowhere in Geneva III are mercenaries mentioned. While
there has been much scholarly debate as to whether or not the
drafters intended to consider mercenary status, most agree that
Geneva III's drafters made no adjustments for mercenaries.1 27
Mercenaries were regularly incorporated into the military dur-
ing the period immediately preceding the enactment of the Ge-
neva Conventions.1 28 The debate on protected status aside, the
collective Geneva Conventions in no way criminalize or
marginalize mercenarism.121
124. Id. art. 13.
125. Id. art. 19.
126. Protocol I is an amendment to the Geneva Conventions.
127. See Milliard, supra note 20, at 21-22 nn.116-22 (tracing the scholastic debate
and general consensus that no perceptible change was made).
128. Before the United States formally entered World War II, U.S. citizen-merce-
naries were incorporated into the war effort. The "Flying Tigers" was a group of Ameri-
can fighter pilots operating under the CAMCO Corporation who "shot down Japanese
planes and targeted infrastructure for three times what regular aviators made, plus a
bonus for every downed plane." PELTON, supra note 36, at 3.
129. See Geneva Convention (I) on Armed Forces in the Field, arts. 49-50, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of
the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at
Sea, arts. 50-51, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Ill, arts. 129-30;
Geneva Convention (V) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
arts. 146-47, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
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The question that immediately comes to mind is whether or
not PMF contractors are affiliated with the military sufficiently to
qualify for POW protections and combatant immunities. An ar-
gument that can be made for extending these protections is that
individual contractors of a PMF are a sort of militia or partisan,
as described in Article 4A of Geneva 111.130
Lindsey Cameron of the University of Geneva's Faculty of
Law argues application of protection to PMF contractors vis-a-vis
Article 4A(2) runs contrary to the intended purpose of the provi-
sions. 131 "The historical purpose," Cameron writes, was to allow
continued partisan fighting by "remnants of a defeated force or
groups seeking to liberate an occupied territory. "132 This is
likely correct. The Commentary to Geneva III makes a single
but striking reference supporting Cameron's assertion: the term
"partisan," "preclude [s] any abusive interpretation which might
have led to the formation of armed bands such as the 'Great
Companies' of baneful memory.1 3 3 That is, the "[m]ercenaries
who devastated France in the 14th century, during the peaceful
periods of the Hundred Years War." '13 4
Begrudgingly, Professor Cameron concedes there is "a very
limited basis" for some PMF contractors in Iraq to classify as law-
ful combatants under international humanitarian law.' 3 5 Not
going out of the way to specify what that basis might be, Cam-
eron cautions that denying protections to contractors could cre-
ate a disincentive to continued observance of humanitarian law
by PMFs, and, as a matter of public policy, it might be best to
extend the protection(s) to contractors.'36 If PMF contractors
cannot be established as combatants under the Geneva context,
they likely stand exposed as civilians engaged in hostilities. The
Geneva Conventions are clear that a civilian loses his or her pro-
tected status when they commit, inter alia, espionage, sabotage,
or homicide against the personnel or equipment of the en-
130. Geneva III, art. 4A.
131. See Lindsey Cameron, Private Military Companies and Their Status Under Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law, 863 INT'L REV. RED CROss 573, 586 (2006).
132. Id.
133. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Commentary on Geneva Convention (III) Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 63 (1960), available at http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/
WebList?ReadForm&id=375&t=com.
134. Id. at 63 n.42.
135. Cameron, supra note 131, at 586.
136. Id. at 586.
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emy. 137
The legal fate of individual contractors turns entirely on
what is meant by "direct participation" in hostilities.138 Because
of inconsistent practice among states, the question must be
taken up case-by-case. 39 This has prompted the International
Committee of the Red Cross to clarify the notion of "direct par-
ticipation" by commissioning expert meetings which began in
2003.140 Five years later, the world is still waiting for answers. 4 1
In the meantime one might look to Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations ("U.N. Charter") for guidance, which per-
mits individual and collective self-defense in response to an
armed attack. 4 2 Analogizing PMFs as agents of the government
on official duty-as was the Blackwater group with the U.S.
Agency for International Development protectee at Nusoor
Square-it is plausible that the principle of self defense and de-
fense of third parties would come into play should a prosecution
be attempted in light of the Geneva Conventions. 143
C. Non-Binding Resolutions of the United Nations
As the Geneva Conventions were being drafted, the U.N.
Charter was enacted, recognizing the sovereignty of Member
States144 and establishing a collective method of addressing
threats to international peace and security."' This included the
requirement that Member States "refrain from the threat or use
137. See Geneva IV, supra note 129, art. 68.
138. Henckaerts, supra note 102, at 190.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Report on the Direct Participation in Hostil-
ities under International Humanitarian Law (Sept. 20, 2003), http://www.icrc.org/Web/
eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/participation-hostilities-ihl-31 1205/$File/Direct%20partici-
pation%20in%20hostilities-Sept%202003.pdf.
141. Convened in 2003 by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the
Working Group on the Direct Participation of Civilians in Hostilities will produce, "af-
ter a final meeting in Geneva," a publication of interpretative guidelines. Chatham
House, Civilians at War: Deconstructing the 21st Century Battlefield 1 (2007), http://www.
chathamhouse.org.uk/files/ 10161 ilOl I107.pdf.
142. U.N. Charter, art. 51.
143. A prosecution is arguably permissible, by analogy, against a "civilian" with the
occupying force who takes up hostilities as an unlawful combatant. See Geneva IV, art.
68 (allowing prosecution of protected persons who take up hostilities against an occu-
pying force); see also Protocol I, supra note 73, art. 51 (explaining that civilians lose their
protections when they take up hostilities).
144. U.N. Charter art. 1, 1.
145. Id. art. 2, 1.
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of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
[p]urposes of the United Nations." '46
Commentators refer to either "aggression" or "intervention"
when referring to states' "threat or use of force." "Aggression" is
common parlance while "intervention" is reserved for discus-
sions on the use of force in relation to the principles of neutral-
ity law under the Hague Conventions. 47 Whatever the lexicon,
the U.N. Charter significantly limits resort to force 4 ' making
limited exceptions for self-defense in the face of an armed at-
tack "'49 and collective use of military force authorized by the U.N.
Security Council. 5 ' Several "non-binding" U.N. resolutions is-
sued between the Charter's entry into force and the adoption of
the Convention Against Mercenaries purportedly place addi-
tional restrictions on state authority to use force, including the
use of mercenaries.' 5'
1. Resolution 2131
In 1965 the U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted
the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Do-
mestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Indepen-
dence and Sovereignty ("Resolution 2131").52 Resolution 2131
bars, for any reason, direct or indirect intervention by one state
into the internal or external affairs of another state.1 53 In lan-
guage particularly germane to this Article, states were also ad-
monished not to "organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tol-
146. Id. art. 2, 4.
147. Milliard, supra note 20, at 23.
148. See U.N. Charter art. 2, 1 4.
149. Id. art. 51.
150. Id. arts. 39, 42.
151. Millard, supra note 20, at 23 ("Several non-binding UN resolutions issued
since 1965, however, may place additional restrictions on states' authority to use force,
to include states' use of mercenaries."); Frangoise Hampson, Mercenaries: Diagnosis
Before Prescription, 3 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 20 (1991) ("General Assembly resolutions,
[while] not binding as such in [the area of resort to armed force], may nevertheless
represent an encapsulation of customary international law. This is particularly likely to
be the case where they are adopted by large majorities, especially if the majority in-
cludes the Security Council veto powers.").
152. See generally Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domes-
tic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A.
Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 21,
1965) [hereinafter Resolution 2131].
153. Id. 1.
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erate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the
violent overthrow of... another State or interfere in civil strife in
another State."'
1 4
While Resolution 2131 does not expressly reference merce-
naries, an argument can be made that its exhortation to not "tol-
erate" any "armed activity" prohibits state recruiting, organizing,
financing or sending mercenaries to intervene in another state's
affairs.' 55 This conceivably includes prevention of a nation's
own citizens from privately undertaking mercenary preparations.
Though enjoying broad support, Resolution 2131 is unlikely to
stand for the proposition that mercenarism is a prohibited activ-
ity. Beyond its failure to specifically mention mercenaries, "no
subsequent UN declaration and few scholars have cited the reso-
lution as authority for this proposition." '156 Rather, Resolution
2131 restricts state behavior toward other states without regard
to whom the state intended to use for the interference.'5 7 Reso-
lution 2131 appears entirely inapplicable to PMFs because they
are not state actors. It is only state recruitment for the purposes
of unjustly intervening in another state's affairs that is pro-
scribed. As private corporations, Resolution 2131 simply does
not reach PMFs.
2. Resolution 2465
Three years after Resolution 2131 was adopted, the Declara-
tion on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples ("Resolution 2465"),158 was adopted by the General
Assembly with a bare majority-fifty-three yeas, eight nays and
forty-three abstentions.' 59 Regarding mercenarism, the resolu-
tion attempted to make the use of mercenaries "against move-
ments for national liberation and independence" a criminal act,
brand mercenaries themselves as "outlaws" and compel Member
States to enact domestic legislation to prevent their citizens from
serving as mercenaries and punish "the recruitment, financing
154. Id. 2 (emphasis added).
155. Milliard, supra note 20, at 24.
156. Id.
157. See Resolution 2131, supra note 153, 1 1, 2.
158. Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Co-
lonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 2465, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 4,
U.N. Doc. A/7218 (Dec. 20, 1968) [hereinafter Resolution 2465].
159. Milliard, supra note 20, at 24.
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and training of mercenaries in their territory."16 ° Having gar-
nered a majority by only two votes, Resolution 2465 cannot be
said to represent a widely accepted international principle. 161
This may explain why the same provision called on Member
States to enact domestic legislation to make the edict enforcea-
ble. 16 2
By this language mercenarism was pronounced, under lim-
ited circumstances, to be a crime. This did not reflect then-ex-
isting international law on mercenarism.163 Rather, it was an at-
tempt by some Member States to put their aspiration against
mercenarism into motion.164 Even in the most generous read-
ing, Resolution 2465 limits itself by applying only to mercenary
activity aimed at suppressing "national liberation and indepen-
dence" movements.1 65 Such language makes Resolution 2465
largely irrelevant outside of the post-colonial context. 1 6 6 If con-
temporary PMFs could be pigeon-holed into the mercenary la-
bel, Resolution 2465 would conceivably apply only in anti-libera-
tion contexts. Thus the PMF use by the post-colonial govern-
ments of Angola and Sierra Leone in the 1990s was entirely
outside of the scope of Resolution 2465, whether the partici-
pants were mercenaries or mere contractors.
3. Resolution 2625
The General Assembly issued the Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-op-
eration Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations ("Resolution 2625"), in 1970. 67 This measure
differs from the previous resolutions in two material respects.
160. Resolution 2465, supra note 159, 1 8.
161. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 103 (1987) (noting resolutions evidence customary international law only
when adopted by large majorities).
162. See Resolution 2465, supra note 158, 8.
163. See Milliard, supra note 20, at 26.
164. Id. (citing Hersch Lauterpacht, Codification and Development of International
Law, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 16, 35 (1955) (distinguishing an aspirational principle from an
emerging rule of customary international law)).
165. Resolution 2465, supra note 158, 8.
166. Milliard, supra note 20, at 27.
167. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/
8028 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Resolution 2625].
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First, it does not limit itself to national independence move-
ments. Second, it softens the language from earlier resolutions
by not condemning state toleration of mercenarism when it
speaks only of a state's "duty to refrain from organizing or en-
couraging ...mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of
another State."' 68
With Resolution 2625, the pendulum swung against state-
sponsored organization or encouragement of mercenarism, re-
gardless of the context. Toleration by the state, however, is not
proscribed by the terms of Resolution 2625. Like those before it,
Resolution 2625 is aimed squarely at the state as a consumer of
mercenary services. The restriction is inconsequential-it pro-
hibits only state organization and incitement of mercenarism. In
this regard it is like Hague V which proscribed only official spon-
sorship and recruitment. Consistent with the principles of neu-
trality embodied in Hague V, Resolution 2625 "stands out be-
cause of its consistency with international law and its lack of po-
litical overtones, two characteristics that may explain the
resolution's unanimous approval and its explicit incorporation
into customary international law by a subsequent decision of the
International Court ofJustice." 169 Resolution 2625 does not pur-
port to prevent private corporations from recruiting, training
and conveying individuals for intervention in the territories of a
sovereign state. This is all the more true when PMFs provide
security services for non-state clients.
4. Resolution 3103
With the Declaration on Basic Principles of the Legal Status
of the Combatants Struggling Against Colonial and Alien Domi-
nation and Racist Regimes ("Resolution 3103"),70 the General
Assembly again took up mercenarism in the context of post-
colonialism. Returning to the political rhetoric of earlier resolu-
tions, it reads: "The use of mercenaries by colonial and racist
r6gimes against the national liberation movements struggling for
168. Id. at 123.
169. Milliard, supra note 20, at 27 (referring to the case Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14 (June 27)).
170. Declaration on Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Strug-
gling Against Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes, G.A. Res. 3103, U.N.
GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (Dec. 12, 1973) [hereinafter
Resolution 3103].
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their freedom and independence from the yoke of colonialism
and alien domination is considered to be a criminal act and the
mercenaries should accordingly be punished as criminals." '171
Like its predecessors, Resolution 3103 speaks to the crimi-
nality of being a mercenary, except it uses "should be punished as
criminals," as compared to describing mercenaries as "out-
laws."'172 Resolution 3103 has been described as a "novel and un-
supported declaration" that in no way criminalizes state use of
mercenaries. 17' This is true because a non-binding resolution
cannot "amount to customary international law unless approved
by wide majorities and affirmed by subsequent state practice.' 74 The
trend toward regulation is manifest in the broader affirmation of
Resolution 3103 (eighty-three yeas, thirteen nays and forty-three
abstentions) as compared to Resolution 2465 (fifty-three yeas,
eight nays and forty-three abstentions). 7  State practice, how-
ever, continued to go against the grain of Resolution 3103.176
In order to apply this resolution to PMFs, one would have to
show the PMF's client to be a racist regime bent on suppressing
a self-determination movement. If both elements were present,
Resolution 3103 would be offended but nothing more. The res-
olution does nothing to criminalize the actions of the state or
the mercenary. Rather, it implores Member States to enact do-
mestic law on point.
171. Id. art. 5.
172. Compare Resolution 3103, supra note 171, 5, with Resolution 2465, supra
note 159, 1 8.
173. Milliard, supra note 20, at 29; see also Frits Kalshoven, Reaffirmation and Develop-
ment of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts: The First Session of the
Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 20 February - 29 March 1974, 5 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 24
(1974) (concluding Resolution 3103 was neither an accurate nor authoritative state-
ment on the law).
174. Milliard, supra note 20, at 30 (citing Wil D. Verwey, The International Hostages
Convention and National Liberation Movements, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 81 (1981) ("[D]oubt
seems to prevail as to whether the claim formulated in [Resolution 3103] has in the
meantime developed into a rule of customary law.")) (emphasis added).
175. Id. at 28.
176. Joseph Wheatley, The Wages of War: Toward a Legal and Legitimate Role for Pri-
vate Military Companies in Africa, 1 J. INT'L L. & PoL'v (2004), available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/groups/ilp/1-1_Whealey-joseph.pdf (citing Kevin A. O'Brien, Private Mil-
itary Companies and African Security: 1990-98, in MERCENARIES: AN AFRICAN SECURITY
DILEMMA 46-48, 62-63 (Abdel-Fatau Musah &J. Kayode Fayemi eds., 2000)). Since the
1960s, numerous African nations hired mercenaries with some regularity in spite of
their professed disdain. See id.
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5. Resolution 3314
An important resolution that enjoyed wide support was the
Definition of Aggression ("Resolution 3314").' 77 Resolution
3314 describes "aggression" as the "use of armed force by a State
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Charter of the United Nations. '17 ' The unjust use of force
can occur via a state's armed forces or by utilizing "mercenaries,
which carry out acts of armed force against another State" or
substantially aid a state in the aggression.
179
With Resolution 3314's adoption by consensus in 1974, it is
apparent that Member States accepted it as customary interna-
tional law."' By its terms, then, Resolution 3314 identifies all
state use of mercenaries to affect unjust "force . . .against the
territorial integrity or political independence of another State"
as an act of aggression, in violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter.' The context of the state's action is not a relevant
criterion (read: not limited to post-colonial struggles). The af-
fected parties of this resolution are not mercenaries or PMFs.
Rather it is the state that commits an unjust aggression by any of
the condemned means. The fate of the individual warriors was
not addressed by the Resolution.
6. An Emerging Trend
When one surveys the aforementioned resolutions, a trend
toward restricting mercenarism is apparent and evidences an
emerging concept of customary international law.'8 2 These re-
strictions, however, apply to the organization, encouragement,
or conveyance of mercenaries by states. 183 Despite this restric-
tion, states are not precluded from tolerating mercenary activities
that lead to a use of armed force in other states.' 84
177. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No.
31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974) [hereinafter Resolution 3314].
178. Id. 1.
179. Id. 3(f), (g).
180. Milliard, supra note 20, at 30.
181. Resolution 3314, supra note 177, art. 1.
182. Milliard, supra note 20, at 30.
183. See id. at 31.
184. See id.
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D. Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
Protocol I builds on Geneva III by proffering a definitive
statement on mercenaries. 18  Accompanying the definition is a
provision discouraging mercenary activity but not one prohibit-
ing it-the result of political compromise.' 86  The Working
Group that drafted Article 47 carried the sentiment that merce-
naries should not enjoy the "fundamental guarantees" of Article
75 of the Protocol.1 17 Ironically, one of the only representatives
putting forth a defense of the historic and contemporary use of
mercenaries and demanding the allowance of the fundamental
guarantees was the Vatican."8 s
Though ratified by approximately eighty-five percent of the
Member States of the U.N., Protocol I's efficacy is limited be-
cause the states most active in international armed conflicts, par-
ticularly the United States, are not party to it.1 89 Of course, pro-
visions of a convention can nevertheless be applicable against a
non-party state when those rules represent customary interna-
tional law,'90 but this necessitates consistent state practice-
something the champions of Article 47 fail to observe.1 91
While Protocol I is widely accepted as a codification of cus-
tomary international law, the categorization of mercenaries as
unlawful combatants in Article 47 is not. 92 The strictures of Arti-
cle 47 are so contentious that universal acceptance is unlikely,
and it risks becoming virtually irrelevant to armed conflicts in-
185. Protocol I, supra note 73, art. 47.
186. See Milliard, supra note 20, at 31 (citing 15 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE DIPLO-
MATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL Hu-
MANITARIAN LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, GENEVA (1974-77) 189-202, 481
(CDDH/III/GT/82, May 13, 1976) [hereinafter OFFICIAL RECORDS]).
187. Id. at 32-33.
188. See id. at 33 (citing 6 OFFICIAL RECORDS 87 (CDDH/SR.41, May 26, 1977))
(arguing that Article 75's Fundamental Guarantees should be extended to mercenaries,
"whatever their faults and their moral destitution.").
189. Henckaerts, supra note 102, at 177.
190. See id.; see also Shawn McCormack, Private Security Contractors in Iraq Violate
Laws of War, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 75, 93-94 (2007). The International Court
of Justice takes great stock in the near-universal ratification of instruments like the
United Nations Charter. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 99-100 (June 27). But see Henckaerts, supra note 102, at 183 (wide popularity
is not in and of itself dispositive).
191. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
192. See Henckaerts, supra note 102, at 187; see also Jarka, supra note 103, at 1-2,
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volving one or more non-contracting parties.' Continued dis-
regard of Article 47 will lead even contracting states to disregard
them. 194
1. What Article 47 Purports to Do
The Working Group discussions leading to Article 47 fo-
cused heavily on the use of mercenaries in Africa since 1960 and
their effect upon post-colonial struggles for self-determina-
tion. 11 5 Looking not much further than this brief decoloniza-
tion period, the Diplomatic Conference ignored more than
three millennia of mercenary use and codified the utility of
mercenarism within internal conflicts and liberation move-
ments.' 96 Article 47 proposes to redress two decades of past griev-
ances by breaking with 3000 years of history by stripping combat-
ant immunities and prisoner of war protections from merce-
naries.19 7 Article 47 goes on to define a mercenary as any person
who:
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight
in an armed conflict;
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in hostilities;
(c) is motivated to take part in hostilities essentially by the
desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on
behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation
substantially in excess of that promised or paid to com-
batants of similar ranks and functions in the armed
forces of that Party;
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resi-
dent of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict; and
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the
conflict on official duty as a member of its armed
forces. 1
98
Article 47 undoubtedly condemns mercenary activities and seeks
193. See Yoram Dinstein, Comments on Protocol 1, 320 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 515
(1997).
194. Cf id. (discussing disregard of Protocol I, in general).
195. Milliard, supra note 20, at 33.
196. See Protocol I, supra note 73, arts. 1(3), 1(4).
197. Id. art. 47(1).
198. Id. art. 47(2).
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to remove the protections otherwise afforded to them.1 99 This is
a significant departure from customary international law which
traditionally gives "mercenaries the same status as the members
of the belligerent force for which they are fighting. ' 200 Professor
Cameron justifies the diminishment of rights solely on what she
describes as "the shameful character of mercenary activity. 20 1
What Article 47 did not do is criminalize mercenarism.
Statements made during and after the Working Group make it
clear that Article 47 falls well short of of that mark.20 2 While
mercenaries might now face domestic prosecution, "[t]he mere
fact of being a mercenary is not ... a criminal act [under Article
47]. "1203 The Soviet Union's closing statement at the Working
Group reinforces this conclusion: "We hope that this article...
will provide an incentive to Governments to adopt domestic leg-
islation prohibiting ...the use of mercenaries. 20 4
2. The "Legislative History" of Article 47
Proponents of Article 47 argue that "this deprivation of
rights represents recent developments in customary interna-
tional law."' 20 5 Regional developments-most notably within the
Organization for African Unity ("African Union" or "OAU")-
are often cited as evidence.20 6 Immediately after the adoption of
199. See id. art. 47(1).
200. Burmester, supra note 115, at 55.
201. Cameron, supra note 131, at 580.
202. Cf Milliard, supra note 20, at 41 (regarding statements made after the Work-
ing Group) (quoting 6 OFFICIAL RECORDS 159, CDDH/SR.41 (1977) ("The aim of [Arti-
cle 47] was to discourage mercenary activity and prevent irresponsible elements from
getting the rights due to a combatant or prisoner of war.") (statement by the Represen-
tative from Indonesia) (emphasis added)).
203. Burmester, supra note 115, at 55.
204. Milliard, supra note 20, at 41 (quoting 6 OFICIAL RECORDS 204 CDDH/SR.41
(1977) (statement by the Representative from the Soviet Union)).
205. Milliard, supra note 20, at 36 (citing Tahar Boumedra, International Regulation
of the Use of Mercenaries in Armed Conflicts, 20 REVUE DE DROIT PENAL MILITAIRE ET DE
DROIT DE LA GUERRE 35, 55-67 (1981)); see also supra Part III.C.6 (discussing the emerg-
ing trend discernable from U.N. General Assembly Resolutions).
206. See, e.g., Milliard, supra note 20, at 36 (referencing the flurry of Conventions
and Resolutions within the African Union on the subject of mercenarism). The follow-
ing were issued in short order by the Organization of African Unity [hereinafter OAU]:
Resolution on Mercenaries, OAU Res. 49 (W), Assembly of Heads of State and Govern-
ment (Sept. 11-14, 1967); Int'l Comm'n of Inquiry on Mercenaries, Draft Convention
on the Prevention and Suppression of Mercenarism, June 1976, reprinted in Paul W.
Mourning, Leashing the Dogs of War: Outlawing the Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries, 22
VA. J. I,',r'L L. 589, 615 (1982) (Luanda Convention); Organization of African Unity,
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Protocol I, Mr. Clark, the Nigerian representative who first pro-
posed Article 47, is reported to have said:
[Nigeria took] the initiative in proposing the new article be-
cause it was convinced that the law on armed conflicts should
correspond to present needs and aspirations. The [Diplo-
matic] Conference could not afford to ignore the several res-
olutions adopted by the United Nations and certain regional
organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity,
which over the years had condemned the evils of mercenaries
and their activities, particularly in Africa .... [Article 47],
therefore, was fully in accordance with the dictates of public
conscience, as embodied in the resolutions of the United Na-
tions.
** *
By adopting [Article 47], the Conference had once and for
all denied to all mercenaries any such rights [as lawful com-
batants or prisoners of war]. The new article [thus] re-
present[s] an important new contribution to humanitarian
law. 20
7
But many observers dispute the notion that Article 47 is a natural
evolution of customary international law,20 8 not the least of
which includes the United States.20 9 The U.S. is not alone in its
concern with Article 47; Burmester disputed Mr. Clark's analysis:
The exaggerated assertions . . . do not appear to reflect the
consensus of the international community. Nevertheless, the
removal of even certain protections from combatants who
would otherwise qualify for such protection must be viewed
with some concern. [While] extending protection under the
laws of war to guerillas, it seems inconsistent to be taking it
away from other combatants .... Once protection is denied
to one class of persons the way is left open for other classes to
be similarly denied protection. If states consider foreign par-
ticipation in national liberation struggles against colonial and
racist regimes to be of such gravity as to require that certain
Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa, (opened for signature) July 3,
1977, OAU Doc. CM/817 (XXIX), Annex 1I (3d rev. 1977) (entered into force Apr. 22,
1985).
207. Milliard, supra note 20, at 36-37 (quoting 6 OFFICIAL RECORDS 157-58
(CDDH/S.R. 41, May 26, 1977) (statement of the Representative from Nigeria)).
208. See, e.g., Hampson, supra note 151, at 9.
209. See Michael J. Natheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Customay
International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 Am. U.J.
Irr'L L. & POL'Y 419, 426 (1987).
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protections not be accorded to mercenaries, it seems only
logical ... that such protections should not be accorded to
any private foreign participants.210
Echoing this concern, John R. Cotton observed that "if guerillas
and other classes of unconventional combatants are to be in-
cluded in the [Geneva] Convention's [Article 4] protections
through the Protocols, then mercenaries should also be in-
cluded. 211
3. What It All Means: Application to Blackwater et al.
The definition in Article 47 of Protocol I is unworkable be-
cause if any one of its six elements is not met, the definition
fails. 2 12 Perhaps the most unworkable element of the mercenary
definition in Article 47 is the showing of an individual merce-
21nary's motivation. 13 By necessity a prosecutor daring to attempt
to show financial gain as the chief motive must include a com-
parison to the motivations of individuals who join states' armies,
many of whom join "mainly for money and [are] in that sense
... mercenary[ies] [themselves]." 2 14 It is unlikely anyone is pre-
pared to argue members of state armies are, in reality, members
of a nationalized free company motivated by health insurance
benefits. If an individual could actually be shown to meet all six
criteria, s/he would be barred from claiming POW protections
or combatant immunities. 215 Even so, s/he would enjoy the fun-
damental guarantees of Article 75 of Protocol 1.216
Modern PMF contractors do not meet all six elements of the
definition of a mercenary under Protocol I and cannot, there-
fore, be summarily stripped by Article 47 of combatant immuni-
210. Burmester, supra note 115, at 55-56 (internal citations omitted).
211. Milliard, supra note 20, at 38 (quoting John R. Cotton, Comment, The Rights
of Mercenaries as Prisoners of War, 77 MIL. L. REV. 143, 164 (1977)).
212. See Cameron, supra note 131, at 578.
213. Protocol I, supra note 73, art. 47(2) (c). The subjectivity of Article 47(2) (c)
will be extremely difficult to prove. See Burmester, supra note 115, at 37-38 (quoting
REPORT OF THE COMM. OF PRIVY COUNSELORS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE RECRUIT-
MENT OF MERCENARIES, CMND. 6569, 7 (1976)).
214. MOCKLER, supra note 36, at 16; see also Cameron, supra note 131, at 580
("many soldiers enlist merely to earn a living.").
215. See Cameron, supra note 131, at 579 (quoting Protocol I, supra note 73, art.
47(1)).
216. See id. (citing Protocol I, supra note 73, art. 45 (extending certain protections
to unlawful combatants)).
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ties and prisoner of war protections. 217 As to the application of
Article 47, three specific elements are unlikely to ever be proven.
First, it is doubtful a serious claim can be put forward that
modern PMF contractors are recruited to fight in an armed con-
flict. Rather, they predominately engage in the protection of
diplomats, which by its very nature seeks to avoid hostilities and
only returns fire long enough to extricate the protectee from the
danger zone and then break contact. 218 The likes of Executive
Outcomes and Sierra Leone are unlikely ever to be repeated. 219
Second, the use of force by PMFs to flee from an ambush
can hardly be described as direct participation in the war effort.
Admittedly, Protocol I considers any military hostilities, whether
offense or defense, to be "participating in hostilities, ' 221 which
the International Committee of the Red Cross understands to be
acts "likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment
of the enemy armed forces."' 22' But direct participation does not
include everything that is merely helpful to one side over the
other.222 The concept of "direct participation" is a murky one,
and its scope remains an open question.223 It is inconceivable,
however, that a working definition would completely preclude
self-defense or the defense of third persons. 2
24
Finally, Article 47 requires the "mercenary" be a citizen of a
state who is not party to the conflict. 225 Most PMF contractors
217. McCormack, supra note 190, at 94, 99. A more plausible argument against
Geneva protections, discussed below, is that PMF contractors are civilians engaged in
hostilities.
218. See, e.g., PHILLIP HOLDER, THE EXECUTIVE PROTECTION PROFESSIONAL'S MAN-
UAL 15, 26-27, 43-48, 59-73 (1997) (emphasizing the importance of avoiding conflict,
evacuating the protectee from danger, and confronting an attacker only as a last re-
sort).
219. See GREEN PAPER, supra note 87, 24.
220. Protocol I, supra note 73, art. 49(1) (defining "attacks" as violence against an
adversary, "whether in offense or in defense").
221. Cameron, supra note 131, at 588 (quoting ICRC COMMENTARY ON GENEVA II,
supra note 133, 1 1944).
222. Id.
223. See supra Part III.B.2.
224. See, e.g., RICHARD MORGAN, PROFESSIONAL MILITARY FIRMS UNDER INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, 9 CHI.J. INT'L L. 213, 216, 221-22 (2008) (arguing that the legal definition
of when an act of self-defense is elevated to "direct participation" is unclear, interpreta-
tions advocated by groups such as the International Committee of the Red Cross con-
sider all acts of self-defense as "direct participation.").
225. Protocol I, supra note 73, art. 47(2) (d) (defining "mercenary" as an individ-
ual that is "neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory con-
trolled by a Party to the conflict.").
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are citizens of states who are party to the conflict, at least in
Iraq.226 Some contractors working with PMFs are not nationals
of a party to the conflict, but this quickly becomes moot when
the showing fails on either of the two criteria discussed above.
4. Is Article 47 Irrelevant?
The United Kingdom's Foreign and Commonwealth Office
recently concluded that Article 47's mercenary definition is com-
pletely unworkable.2 2 7 Undeterred, the General Assembly incor-
porated these shortcomings into its latest plink at mercenaries:
the Convention Against Mercenaries. 22' As discussed below, the
Convention falls flat because of the same definitional problems
plaguing Article 47.
E. United Nations Convention Against Mercenaries
The U.N. took up the question of mercenarism again in
1980 in response to dissatisfaction among Member States with
Protocol I's shortcomings, 229 and so began nine years of U.N.
NewSpeak toward the creation of a comprehensive instrument
for the "eradication of these nefarious activities . . 230 The
convention was adopted in 1989 and opened for signatures,23'
but did not become effective until 2001.32
The Convention Against Mercenaries provides a primary
and secondary definition of "mercenary." The primary defini-
tion incorporates the largely unworkable elements of Protocol I,
Article 47.23 However, two distinctions need be addressed. The
primary definition applies to all armed conflicts, notjust interna-
tional armed conflicts. 23 4 Also, "direct participation in hostili-
226. See McCormack, supra note 190, at 94.
227. U.K. GREEN PAPER, supra note 87, 6.
228. See generally U.N. Convention Against Mercenaries, supra note 73.
229. Milliard, supra note 20, at 57.
230. U.N. General Assembly, Sixth Committee, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee
on the Drafting of an International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financ-
ing and Training of Mercenaries, U.N. Doc. A/44/766 (Nov. 22, 1989) (prepared by
Giullaume Pambov-Tchivounda).
231. Milliard, supra note 20, at 58.
232. See generally Press Release, General Assembly, Mercenaries Often a Presence in
Terrorist Attacks, Special Rapporteur Tells Third Committee as It Begins Discussions
on Self-Determination, U.N. Doc. GA/SHC/3650 (Oct. 31, 2001).
233. U.N. Convention Against Mercenaries, supra note 73, art. 1(1).
234. See id. art. 16(b).
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ties" was removed as a definitional element and made an enu-
merated offense. 235
Having already discussed the failings of the Article 47 defini-
tion, further discussion of the primary definition is bypassed in
favor of analysis of the secondary definition. The secondary defi-
nition of the convention reads:
A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation:
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose
of participating in a concerted act of violence aimed at:
(i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise under-
mining the constitutional order of a State; or
(ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a State;
(b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire
for significant private gain and is prompted by the
promise or payment of material compensation;
(c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against
which such an act is directed;
(d) Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and
(e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on
whose territory the act is undertaken. 236
The convention goes on to articulate four categories of persons
criminally liable: (1) anyone "who recruits, uses, finances or
trains mercenaries;" 2 7 (2) a mercenary "who participates di-
rectly in hostilities or in a concerted act of violence; '2 8 (3) any-
one who attempts to commit the offenses in (1) or (2);2 3 ' and
(4) anyone who is an accomplice to any offense (1) through
(3) 240
The Convention Against Mercenaries also establishes states'
responsibilities. Article 5 provides that states "shall not recruit,
use, finance or train mercenaries" for any purpose, and specifi-
cally, states shall not do so "for the purpose of opposing the le-
gitimate exercise of the inalienable right of peoples to self-deter-
mination. '241 Thus, states are purported to have an affirmative
obligation to "prohibit" such activities, in general, and specifi-
cally "prevent" them if they are intended to oppose a self-deter-
235. See id. art. 3.
236. Id. art. 1 (2).
237. Id. art. 2.
238. Id. art. 3(1).
239. Id. art. 4(a).
240. Id. art. 4(b).
241. Id. arts. 5(1), 5(2).
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mination movement.24 2 The Convention Against Mercenaries
makes an unmistakable distinction for the first time in interna-
tional law: all states shall refrain from using mercenaries.243
A strong argument exists that the Convention Against Mer-
cenaries is irrelevant and freely ignored. Enacted in 1989, the
Convention did not become "effective" until 2001,244 when the
requisite twenty-second state ratified the Convention. 245 As of
November 2008, only nine additional states have acceded to its
terms-three of them with reservations, bringing to thirty-one
the total number of Member States that have ratified the Con-
vention.246 Ironically, only one African Union state that advo-
cated and signed the Convention, Cameroon, ever ratified it.2 4 7
At least two of the African signatories-Angola and the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo-subsequently hired merce-
naries.24 8 Low accession and contrary practice militate against
the Convention being a true codification of customary interna-
tional law, and therefore it is arguably not binding.
Conventional wisdom holds that mercenaries are not moti-
vated by political or noble causes. 2 4 9 Lawmakers attempting to
regulate (or ban) mercenaries repeatedly point out this inherent
trait as an "evil. '' 250 The secondary definition echoes this theme
but lowers the threshold by describing the requisite compensa-
tion as "significant private gain," doing so without providing a
benchmark.25 ' The evidentiary problems remain insurmounta-
242. Milliard, supra note 20, at 63.
243. See U.N. Convention Against Mercenaries, supra note 73, art. 5.
244. See generally Press Release, General Assembly, Mercenaries Often a Presence in
Terrorist Attacks, Special Rapporteur Tells Third Committee as it Begins Discussions on
Self-Determination, U.N. Doc. GA/SHC/3650 (Oct. 31, 2001).
245. U.N. Convention Against Mercenaries, supra note 73, art. 19.
246. For a current list of contracting states, see http://treaties.un.org/doc/publi-
cation/mtdsg/volume%20ii/chapter%20xviii/xviii-6.en.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2008)
(listing a current record of contracting states).
247. See Milliard, supra note 20, at 65. "The original signatories were Angola, Re-
public of the Congo (formerly Congo-Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo (for-
merly Zaire .. .), Cameroon, Morocco, and Nigeria." Id. at 65 n.371.
248. Id. at 65 (quoting HERBERT M. HOWE, AMBiGuOus ORDER: MILITARY FORCES IN
AFRICAN STATES 187 n.4 (2001)). Up to eighteen African nations have hired merce-
naries since the 1960s. Wheatley, supra note 176, at 10 n.60 (citing HOWE, supraat 228).
249. Milliard, supra note 20, at 60 (citing 15 OFFCIAL RECORDS 196, CDDH/III/
SR.57, Apr. 29, 1977 (statement of Mr. Alkaff, Yemen: "Mercenaries [have] always been
attracted by the hope of gain. ).
250. Id. at 60.
251. U.N. Convention Against Mercenaries, supra note 73, art. 1 (2)(b).
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ble for the unfortunate prosecutor tasked with proving illicit mo-
tivation. 252 Even if proven, the illegality of being a mercenary
under the convention has no enforcement mechanism beyond
domestic legislation that each contracting state was to enact 25 3-
something they were free to do before the convention.
The secondary definition of the U.N. Convention Against
Mercenaries most likely does not apply to PMF contractors.254
This is true because PMF contractors are not recruited to partici-
pate in a "concerted act of violence" aimed at overthrowing or
undermining a state.255 Also, it is a herculean task to prove that
the motive for contracting is financial gain.256 With at least two
criteria falling short, PMF contractors as they are currently oper-
ating will not find themselves afoul of the Convention Against
Mercenaries anytime soon.
Without exception, the Convention Against Mercenaries
purports to prohibit individual and state use of mercenaries.257
With only sixteen percent of the Member States of the U.N.
party to it and wide-spread state practice contrary to its terms,
the Convention cannot reasonably be argued as indicative of cus-
tomary international law. Accordingly, the 162 Member States
not party to the convention are free of its strictures.
258
F. Tracking the Trend
Though only a handful of the U.N. instruments discussed
truly reflect customary international law with regards to the use
of mercenaries, taken together they begin to reshape the field.
The numerous non-binding resolutions and even the off-the-
mark conventions whittle away at the traditional law of war. In
252. See Milliard, supra note 20, at 61 n.338.
253. Gaston, supra note 93, at 232 (citing Convention Against Mercenaries, art.
3(1)).
254. Id. at 233 (citing Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Business Goes to War: Private Mili-
tary/Security Companies and International Humanitarian Law, 88 INT'L REV. RED CROss 525,
568-70 (2006) (discussing why most PMFs do not meet the six-point cumulative defini-
tion of "mercenary")).
255. See U.N. Convention Against Mercenaries, supra note 73, art. 3(1).
256. Gaston, supra note 93, at 233 (citing Protocol 1, supra note 73, art. 47(2) and
U.N. Convention Against Mercenaries, supra note 73, art. 1 (b)).
257. U.N. Convention Against Mercenaries, supra note 73, arts. 2, 5.
258. Compare United Nations, http://un.org/members/Iist.shtmI (last visited Sept.
17, 2008) (listing the 192 current Member States of the United Nations), with United
Nations Treaty Collection, supra note 246 (listing the thirty-one Member States who
have ratified the U.N. Convention Against Mercenaries).
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this, a handful of Member States have been successful in laying a
foundation upon which future accessions and restrictions might
be built.
The sage counsel of Burmester 259 and Cotton 2 60 cautioning
against the reduction of protections has fallen upon deaf ears.
Though Professor Cameron admits that "weakening of protec-
tion for a group of persons is highly unusual and goes against
the tenor of ... humanitarian law," she promotes the practice in
order to "discourage [would-be mercenaries] from putting
themselves in . . . a vulnerable position .. ".. 21' For now, no
such binding "structures" have been built upon this ill-advised
foundation. In fact, opponents of PMFs reluctantly concede that
current attitudes among the international community render in-
novations like the U.N. Convention Against Mercenaries as in-
struments of"'anti-customary' [international] law. ' 26 2 Still, inso-
far as the ineffective U.N. Convention Against Mercenaries and
non-binding Resolutions discourage contractors from entering
the field of battle, the view of commentators like Cameron seems
to be: mission accomplished.
IV. ARE CONTRACTORS OF PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS
ABOVE THE LAW?
Though PMF contractors are not subject to international
laws on mercenarism, 26 1 it would be incorrect to think them alto-
gether without accountability. Extraterritorial criminal jurisdic-
tion over PMF contractors can be-and has been-achieved by
three different statutory devices: the Special Maritime and Terri-
torial Jurisdiction of the United States ("SMTJ"), the Military Ex-
traterritorial Jurisdiction Act ("MEJA"), and the recent amend-
ment to Article 2(a) (10) of the UCMJ. An exercise of jurisdic-
tion under SMTJ and/or MEJA rests with the Attorney General
through the respective U.S. Attorneys' Offices; the expanded
court martial authority by the military ultimately resides, to the
259. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
261. Cameron, supra note 131, at 579-80.
262. Salzman, supra note 15, at 879.
263. See generally Jonathon Finer, Holstering the Hired Guns: New Accountability Mea-
sures for Private Security Contractors, 33 YALEJ. INT'L L. 259, 260 (2008) (noting that secur-
ity contractors do not fit neatly under the U.N. Convention Against Mercenaries).
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surprise of many, with the Department of Justice ("DOJ"). 26 4
A. SMTJ
The SMTJ originally created eight express areas of special
jurisdiction that purported to extend to the ends of the earth.265
If not that far, then the SMTJ reached at least to those areas
where U.S. citizens or property were in jeopardy, but no other
government was effectively safeguarding those interests.266 The
USA PATRIOT Act added a ninth area: offenses committed by
or against a U.S. citizen or national or on/in a facility used for
U.S. foreign missions or operations.2 6' This basis, and one
other-offenses committed by or against U.S. citizens or nation-
als in a location outside the jurisdiction of any nation (read:
failed states) 261-prove the most germane to combat zones and
contingency operations of today's armed conflicts.
Despite its expansive reach, only one prosecution has come
under the SMTJ since the Global War on Terrorism began.
David Passaro, a contract interrogator for the CIA, was convicted
for aggravated assault in connection with the death of Abdul
Wali after a two-day "interrogation" at a U.S. base in Afghanistan
in 2003.269 This prosecution, brought in the Eastern District of
North Carolina, was made possible by the PATRIOT Act expan-
sion of the SMTJ. 270
B. MEJA
MEJA builds upon the SMTJ by extending U.S. jurisdiction
to crimes committed by personnel operating with or near the
U.S. military outside of U.S. territory, provided the offense is
punishable by more than one year imprisonment.271 It includes
concurrent court martial authority in some cases. 2 7 2 Any custo-
264. Memorandum from Robert Gates, Sec'y of Defense to Sec'ys of the Military
Dep'ts et al. (Mar. 10, 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Gates Memo].
265. Anthony Giardino, Using Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Prosecute Violations of the
Law of War: Looking Beyond the War Crimes Act, 44 B.C. L. REv. 699, 715 (2007).
266. Id. at 715 n.117.
267. Id. at 715 n.121 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 7(9) (2001)).
268. The USA PATRIOT Act, 18 U.S.C. § 7(7) (2001).
269. See CIA Worker Is Jailed Over Beating, BBC NEws, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
americas/6359657.stm (last visited Oct. 4, 2008).
270. See Giardino, supra note 265, at 117.
271. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3261 (a)(1) (2000).
272. 18 U.S.C. § 3261(c) (2000).
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dial actions must be taken by Department of Defense ("DOD")
law enforcement officers with transfer to foreign criminal justice
systems possible, but only by order of a U.S. judge or the Secre-
tary of Defense under military necessity.27 3 MEJA is limited,
however, to civilian employees and contractors of the DOD and
those dependents accompanying them overseas.274
MEJA has a troubled past and a doubtful future. Signed
into law under President Bill Clinton, the limitations of MEJA
became immediately apparent in the aftermath of Abu Ghraib-
only the DOD contactors and enlisted soldiers were within
prosecutorial reach.2 75 Congress rushed to close this loophole
by including within its scope all contractors "supporting the mis-
sion of the Department of Defense. '27 6 As Ian Kierpaul astutely
notes in his recent article, Congress only made matters worse by
potentially offending the void for vagueness doctrine and politi-
cal question doctrines with this change. 277
After the Nusoor Square incident, Congress looks to replace
one poorly drafted amendment with another, substituting "sup-
porting the mission" with "work[ing] under [a] contract ... car-
ried out in an area, or in close proximity to an area . . . where
the Armed Forces is conducting a contingency operation."278
Absent definitions and guidance from Congress, the Bush Ad-
ministration expressed its concerns over the continued ambigu-
ity279 but the bill has been dormant in the Senate without modifi-
cation since October 2 0 0 7. 280
C. UCMJ
The most recent change to extraterritorial jurisdiction is the
UCMJ expansion of court martial authority over civilian contrac-
273. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3262-3264 (2000).
274. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3267(1), (2) (2000).
275. Ian Kierpaul, The Mad Scramble of Congress, Lawyers, and Law Students After Abu
Ghraib: The Rush to Bring Private Military Contractors to Justice, 39 U. TOL. L. RaV. 407, 416
(2008) (noting that contractors from the Department of the Interior were also present
and participating, but entirely beyond the reach of Military Extraterritorial Judicial
Act).
276. Id. at 417.
277. Id. at 417-21.
278. Id. at 422 (citing H.R. 2740, 110th Congress (2007)).
279. Id. at 422 (citingJonathan Weisman, House Acts in Wake of Blackwater Incident,
WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2007, at A6).
280. For the latest information on H.R. 2740 see http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
bdquery/z?dllO:h2740: (last visited Nov. 4, 2008).
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tors accompanying the military by adding "or a contingency op-
eration" to Article 2(a) (10).211 Senator Lindsey Graham spon-
sored the amendment to bring contractors within the control of
military commanders.282 The chief question put forward by nu-
merous legal commentators is whether or not the statute is con-
stitutional.2"' Another objection is the absence of procedural
guidance from Congress.28 4
1. Historically Speaking
Military authority over accompanying civilians was unques-
tioned from before the Constitution, 281 until 1970 when then
the Court of Military Appeals interpreted "in time of war" to
mean only declared wars.286 That case, United States v. Averette,287
sounded the "death knell" for civilian court martial authority. 288
The presumption that controlled after Averette was that civilian
contractors were largely beyond the reach of convening authori-
ties in the military. 2 9 That is, until the October 2006 amend-
ment to Article 2(a) (10) of the UCMJ.
2. Initial Criticisms
The procedural aspects were lacking when the amendment
was first introduced. In fact, recommendations from the Joint
Chiefs of Staff were not submitted until January 2008.290 The
lament of missing procedural directives was answered in March
2008 when Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued a memoran-
281. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 2 (a) 10, 10 U.S.C. § 802 (a) (10) (2008)
[hereinafter "UCMJ"].
282. See generally Cara-Ann M. Hamaguchi, Between War and Peace: Exploring the Con-
stitutionality of Subjecting Private Civilian Contractors to the UCMJ During Contingency Opera-
tions, 86 N.C. L. REv. 1047 (2008).
283. Id. at 1050.
284. See id.
285. Finer, supra note 263, at 261. For a masterfully written and refreshingly objec-
tive survey of Supreme Courtjurisprudence on the question of military courts martial of
civilians, see Kara M. Sacilotto, Jumping the (Un)constitutional Gun?: Constitutional Ques-
tions in the Application of the UCMJ to Contractors, 37 PUB. CONT. L.J. 179, 189 (2008).
286. Geoffrey S. Corn, Bringing Discipline to the Civlianization of the Battlefield: A Pro-
posal for a More Legitimate Approach to Resurrecting Military-CriminalJurisdiction over Civilian
Augmentees, 62 U. MIAMI L. REv. 491, 495 (2008).
287. United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363 (C.M.A. 1970).
288. Finer, supra note 263, at 261.
289. See Corn, supra note 286, at 495-96.
290. See Sacilotto, supra note 285, at 187.
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dum outlining a deferential policy of prosecution. 291 The De-
partment of Justice has the first bite at the apple and only if it
declines to prosecute are military commanders permitted to ex-
ercise their newly restored court martial authority over civilian
contractors.292
There remain many critics who challenge the constitutional-
ity of Article 2(a) (1) by citing to the Supreme Court opinion in,
among others, Reid v. Covert.29 ' The difficulty with Reid is that its
holding was narrowly focused on a different statute and facts di-
vergent from those relevant to PMF contractors. The statute,
then codified as UCMJ Art. 2(11), was held unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court because the statute granted court martial au-
thority over civilian dependents accompanying military person-
nel overseas during peace time.294 Justice Black expressly distin-
guished former Article 2(10), the predecessor of UCMJ Article
2(a) (10), as not at issue and not within the scope of the Court's
decision. 295 In any event, Reid was a plurality decision and can-
not be viewed as the final word on the question of civilians and
courts martial.
3. The Test Case: United States v. Ali
How military commanders might use this new-found author-
ity and whether the procedural differences between Article III
courts and Article I military courts would be tolerated has only
been speculated upon until now. 296 The case of Alaa "Alex" Mo-
hammad Ali, a contract interpreter who stabbed another con-
291. Gates Memo, supra note 264.
292. Id.
293. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1957). One commentator substantively
incorporating Reid is Ian Kierpaul. See Kierpaul, supra note 275, at 412-14, 426.
294. Reid, 354 U.S. at 3-5.
295. Id. at 34 n.61.
296. Michael J. Navarre & John O'Connor, Steptoe &Johnson LLP, International
Law Advisory: Contractors "In the Field" Now Subject to Military Justice (Mar. 12,
2007), http://www.steptoe.com/publications-4325.html (citing the applicability of Arti-
cle 92 of the UCMJ at n.3:
[S]ervice members do not have the right to a jury trial under the Sixth
Amendment or the right to presentment and indictment under the Fifth
Amendment. See generally United States v. Leonard, 63 M.J. 398 (C.A.A.F. 2006)
(no Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial); U.S. Constitution, Amendment V,
in part, "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infa-
mous, crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land and naval forces .... ").
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tractor in the chest after an argument, was the first to make use
of the expanded court martial jurisdiction. 29 7 After the DOJ de-
clined to take the case, it was referred by the convening author-
ity for court martial on the charge of aggravated assault on May
10, 2008.298
The military attorney representing Ali intended to contest
jurisdiction on the theory that Congress specifically intended the
expanded court martial authority to reproach only United States
citizens operating as security contractors overseas, not interpret-
ers who are not even United States citizens, and should there-
fore be dismissed.299 Instead of trying the case, Alaa Mohammad
Ali "pleaded guilty to wrongful appropriation of a knife ... ob-
struction of justice for wrongfully disposing of the knife .. .and
making a false official statement to military investigators. 3 0 0
Still, the case is expected to create important precedent that may
eventually reach American security contractors.3 0'
4. Tying It All Together
Senator Graham has opined that the use of private contrac-
tors is the way wars will be waged in the future and that the law
needs to adapt to these changing realities.10 2 As codified, the
MEJA-enhanced jurisdiction of the SMTJ applies only to DOD
civilian employees, contractors and the dependents accompany-
ing them overseas. The pending amendment to broaden its
scope to all contractors working in proximity to the military was
poorly conceived and is likely too vague to withstand constitu-
tional review, if it passes.
If not under MEJA, PMF contractors certainly are within the
scope of the recent changes to the UCMJ. While Article
2(a) (10) is likely the best way to restore the accountability miss-
ing since Averette, the court martial jurisdiction includes matters
297. Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Charges Contractor at Iraq in Stabbing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
5, 2008, at A6; see also Civilian Contractor Convicted at a Court-Martial, U.S. FED. NEWS, Jun.
23, 2008, available at 2008 WrLNR 11856253.
298. See generally Civilian Contractor Convicted at a Court-Martial, supra note 297.
299. Michael R. Gordon, Military Role Overseeing Contractors Tested in Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, at A16. Alaa Mohammad Ali is a dual Iraqi-Canadian citizen work-
ing as an interpreter for the Titan Corporation, which provides interpreters for the U.S.
military. Id.
300. Civilian Contractor Convicted at a Court-Martial, supra note 296.
301. See Gordon, supra note 297.
302. See Gensheimer, supra note 13.
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of discipline under the UCMJ, not just criminal acts.30 3 Serious
questions on whether or not convening authorities may exercise
the same degree of control of fundamental rights over contrac-
tors as they do service members are on the horizon. As to prose-
cuting violent acts, arguably the goal of Article 2(a) (10), United
States v. Ali may provide the Supreme Court with the opportunity
to decide the question definitively. 0 4
CONCLUSION
Despite the historic use of mercenaries in warfare, their
conduct during the decolonization period of the 1950s and
1960s turned international opinion against their use. To date,
international instruments that address mercenarism are largely
ineffective because they lack broad support from the Member
States of the United Nations and contrary state practice militates
against the rules becoming norms under customary interna-
tional law. Even if there was broader consensus and the conven-
tions, protocols and resolutions represented the will of the inter-
national community, the definitions themselves are doomed
from poor draftsmanship. Nevertheless, there is a developing
trend against mercenarism in international law.
Another undeniable trend is the use of PMFs in force pro-
tection roles in close proximity to military units during armed
conflicts. Meanwhile a segment of legal commentators work to
brand PMF contractors as mercenaries. Events like Nusoor
Square, regardless of what truly happened that day, are certain
to be seized upon to condemn PMFs as deserving to be regulated
out of existence. Until that day comes, however, PMF contrac-
tors are not "mercenaries" as the term now stands-and neither
are most mercenaries.
303. Gates Memo, supra note 291.
304. The last military prosecutions of civilian contractors occurred during the Viet-
nam War, all of which were struck down by the United States Supreme Court. See Court-
martial Ordered for Civilian Contractor, L.A. TIMEs, May 12, 2008, at 6, available at 2008
WLNR 8909973.
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